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Abstract
In this paper we are interested in investigating the effects of the three-
part tariffs system on consumers’ behavior in the local fixed telephone 
service provided by the incumbent Telecommunications Company 
u n e  in Medellín, which was authorized by the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission (c r t , for its Spanish name). In order to study 
consumer behavior and the effect of this tariff system we specify a sort 
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of Engel Curve, which relates expenditure in fixed telephone service 
and expenditure in public utilities. Endogeneity problems could well 
arise from this specification, so the empirical strategy for studying 
households’ consumption is based on a panel data analysis by perfor-
ming instrumental variables and g m m  procedures. Our results supports 
the hypothesis that consumers surpass expected consumption levels 
and therefore the total payment for the service is greater than planned, 
showing a sort of short-run irrationality in consumption.
Key words: Three-part tariffs, consumers’ behavior, rationality, endo-
geneity, g m m  estimators.
j e l classification: C14, C33, G38, D12, D60.
Resumen
En este artículo se estudia el efecto de las tarifas en tres partes sobre 
el comportamiento de los consumidores en el consumo de servicios de 
telefonía local fija suministrados por la firma u n e , con la autorización 
de la Comisión de Regulación de Telecomunicaciones (c r t ). Para ello 
se especifica un tipo de modelo empírico correspondiente a lo que se 
conoce como curva de Engel, la cual relaciona el gasto en telefonía 
fija y el gasto total en servicios públicos. Algunos problemas de 
endogeneidad surgen, de modo que se aplica un método de momentos 
generalizado a la estructura de datos de panel subyacente. Adicional-
mente, se estima un modelo dinámico de datos de panel para observar 
el ajuste mensual en el consumo. Los resultados sugieren que los 
consumidores, lejos de aprender de los errores, sistemáticamente se 
equivocan y sobrepasan su consumo esperado, lo que indica cierta 
irracionalidad en el corto plazo.
Palabras clave: tarifa en tres partes, comportamiento del consumidor, 
irracionalidad, endogeneidad, estimadores g m m .





Nowadays the use of nonlinear tariffs in public utility services is 
very common. They are based on the assumption that consumers will 
behave rationally by making choices according to their expectation 
of monthly consumption of telephone minutes. Moreover, that kind 
of system tariffs are supposed to improve the consumers’ welfare by 
increasing the surplus of the highest demands, increasing the provider’s 
revenue and ensuring the participation of the lowest demand in the 
market (Brown and Sibley, 1983; Willig, 1978). On this regard, Arms-
trong (2005) and Reiss and White (2006), among others, find that it 
depends heavily on several circumstances; since on the one hand, in 
a monopoly situation, the provider’s revenue increases greatly, but 
overall consumer surplus could be reduced, favoring some (mainly 
high demands) and in detriment of low demands, and on the other 
hand, under competition, these results will be ambiguous. The final 
outcome will depend on the consumers’ response and the information 
firms have about consumers.
A type of non-linear tariff that has been used recently, mainly in tele-
communications, is the well-known three-part tariff. It comprises a 
fixed charge, called access price, a “basic” consumption included in 
the fixed charge and a price for each additional unit of consumption 
in excess of the basic consumption, usually called marginal price. 
The fixed charge increases with the basic consumption chosen, 
and the variable charge decreases with each chosen plan. Marginal 
price increases if the actual consumption is greater than the “basic” 
consumption.
The effects of this pricing scheme on consumers’ behavior have not 
been sufficiently explored in the empirical literature. Lambrecht, 
Seim, Skiera, Thomadsen and Viard (2007) find that the consumer’s 
choice is based on the fixed charge of the plan rather than on expected 
consumption, which will be later determined according to the chosen 
plan. The consumers’ uncertainty potentially reduces their welfare and 
increases the firm’s revenues, which are higher than those obtained 
with a two-part tariff. Nonetheless, the array of consumers’ choices 
under a scheme designed to maximize profits must be explored from an 
empirical point of view (see, for instance, Reiss and White, 2006). 150
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This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of three-part 
tariffs on consumers’ behavior in the local fixed telephone service 
provided by the incumbent Telecommunications Company  u n e  in 
Medellín since February 2006 until December 2006 when t e l m e x 
entered the market. This non-linear tariff was authorized by the Tele-
communications Regulatory Commission (c r t , for its Spanish name), 
through Resolution 1250 of 2005, allowing companies to offer to 
consumers tariff plans according to their consumption needs, which 
replaced the traditional fixed-charge and variable charge per telephone 
impulse tariff. An important consequence of three-part tariffs we 
explore is that there are winners as well as losers, which is not only 
a function of the type of demands, whether high or low, and this kind 
of tariffs could encourage a persistent increase in consumption over 
time.
The empirical strategy for studying month-to-month households’ 
consumption is based on a panel data analysis. The first approach 
consists of specifying a linear relationship among the regressors 
(invariant across time), the non-observable heterogeneities and the 
households’ monthly minutes consumption. The possibility of endoge-
neity between minutes consumption (and telephone expenditure) and 
expenditure on other public utility services (water, garbage disposal 
and electricity) forces us to correct the problem by performing the 
Generalized Method of Moments-g m m .
The second approach, which is dynamic, consists of specifying a linear 
relationship between minutes consumption and its lag. Again, in this 
context endogeneity problems will appear when we try to estimate the 
parameter of interest by using a first-difference model, so that the g m m  
estimator offers an alternative to study consumption adjustment over 
time. The main advantage of the g m m  procedure is that it allows us to 
use all possible lags as instruments. For the sake of comparison, we 
also show the estimations using the o l s  approach, Anderson-Hsiao’s 
procedure, within-groups estimations, Two-Stage Least Squares (2s l s) 
and g m m .
The layout of this paper is as follow: First, non-linear tariff mecha-
nisms are defined and three-part tariff consequences on behavior are 




is given and econometric estimation results are offered. Finally, our 
conclusions and interesting topics for future research are presented
I.  Nonlinear and three-part tariffs
Usually two-part tariffs distinguish between average and marginal 
payment1. The type of payment is determined by consumers’ 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics rather than by the 
company’s cost structure. This payment scheme improves efficiency 
with respect to a tariff system that equals the average cost (provided 
that the marginal price is less than the average cost); in consequence 
the resulting deficit is compensated with a fixed charge (access charge) 
that turns up from distributing the fixed cost among all the demands. 
The implementation of two-part tariffs will be socially plausible 
providing that the fixed charge is such that the income-effect is low 
and ensuring that low-demand consumers are not excluded from the 
service (low income level or weak preferences).
In Colombia, this type of tariff was applied to the local telephone service 
until 2005, where the average reference cost (CMeR) was charged 
through the monthly tariff T(q) = F + p(q) where T(q) = (CMeR – CC)/12 
and CC is the connection charge (access to the network). The average 
reference cost CMeR is a yearly-based component of the remunerated 
long term average cost (usually 15 years) with a rate of return of 13% 
and additional adjustment factors due to total costs dispersion and 
companies’ demands in the different localities. Moreover, a range 
for the charge of F was established, that is, 0,15 T(q) « F «0,50 T(q),   
1  There are different forms of price discrimination, including charging different consumers 
different prices for the same good (third-degree price discrimination); making the marginal 
price depend on the number of units purchased (nonlinear pricing) or on whether other 
products are also purchased from the same firm (bundling); whether this is the first time a 
consumer has purchased from the firm (introductory offers; customer “poaching”) or whether 
the customer has previously purchased other similar goods from the firm. On the other hand, 
a firm’s range of instruments to discriminate prices depends on the possibility of arbitrage 
and resale between consumers, on their ability to make anonymous contact with firms and 
pretend to be a new customer, thus benefiting from introductory prices. Finally it will depend 
on whether the regulatory entity allows the firm to discriminate prices, keeping maximum 
prices or average costs constant and whether it is aware of the possibility of firms passing 
information to other firms about their customers’ behavior in different markets (Armstrong, 
2005).152
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where F represents the basic costs of permanent availability of the 
service, in which much variability should not exist (Resolution 087 of 
1997 of the c r t ). This led to the implementation of different two-part 
tariffs in each city, depending on the relationship between F and p(q) 
chosen by the local provider. 
On applying the different two-part tariffs (the most common form 
of non-linear tariffs) the economics of regulation suggests it is more 
convenient to offer as many different tariff plans as there are consu-
mers. The highest fixed charge corresponds with lower variable 
payment so that consumers self-select the most convenient plan, 
depending on their preferences, income, and expected consumption. 
Consequently, the lowest demand would pay a high variable charge and 
a fixed charge nearing zero whereas the highest demand would pay a 
high fixed charge and a marginal price going to zero, thus avoiding the 
exclusion of low demand consumers and reducing the average payment 
of the highest demands (Brown and Sibley, 1986). These tariffs can be 
used in the same city, locality or neighborhood regardless of the cost 
of providing the service.
So far it has been held that two-part tariffs will improve welfare, 
understood as the sum of the surplus of consumers and the benefits of 
the firm, in comparison with a tariff equal to the average cost. We mean 
that any uniform price, other than the marginal cost, can be dominated 
in Pareto’s sense by a non-linear tariff program and by increasing at 
least the welfare of the highest demands, increasing company revenue, 
and holding the lowest demands at least constant (Brown and Sybley, 
1986; Willig, 1978).
This latter is what Armstrong (2005) and Reiss and White (2006), 
among others, pointed out, using dynamic models or revising the 
welfare issue in the supply-demand space instead of the typical forma-
lization of the firm’s budget restriction of the welfare economy. As we 
mentioned before, this depends on several circumstances since, under 
a monopoly situation, the firm’s revenues are highly increased, but 
overall consumers’ surplus is reduced in favor of some (mainly high 
demands) and against low demands, and thus the effects on welfare are 
ambiguous. When consumers are new or do not know the offers well, 




when the firm supplies several products and establishes minimum-term 
contract from consumers. Under competition, results are not clear and 
depend on the consumers’ response and on the information firms have 
about consumers.
In practice, a firm can design different non-linear tariffs, depending 
on the distribution of the costs between the fixed and the variable part 
(graph 1). Across the tariffs, we find: 1) A two-part tariff with both 
a fixed part and a variable component with a slope constant, which 
can exclude lower demands; 2) A two-part tariff where the highest 
fixed charges correspond with lower variable charges, as demands 
gets higher; 3) A fixed-fee block tariff, increasing this charge with an 
increase in the allowed consumption amount; 4) A variable-charge-only 
tariff, decreasing this charge as demand increases; 5) Fixed payment or 
variable charge change as demanded amounts change until reaching a 
tariff of the kind F(q), as in 3), or p(q) in the case of 4), both declining 
as consumption increases; 6) Finally, a generalized non-linear tariff 
program T(q) = F(q) + p(q) could be sketched to pool all the possibi-
lities (Braeutigam, 1989). 







Variable charge per blocks
Fixed fee block
Source: Authors’ design.
In 2005, the c r t  issued Resolution 1250: “Consumers will be able 
to choose tariff plans according to their consumption needs and in 
correspondence with the current trends under which the Telecommuni-154
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cations industry is developed in Colombia and the world”. This allowed 
companies with a market-share over 60% to offer different plans as 
long as their revenues were kept constant and with the restriction to 
offer the lower-income strata consumers (especially strata i and ii) a 
variable-cost-only tariff within the plans. The following is the tariff 
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Table 1.  u n e ’s tariff scheme.
Plans (*) qi Fi(qi) Pi(q-qi)
Indifference consumption 
between plans i e i +1
1 100 12000 60 150
2 300 15000 54 504
3 600 26000 48 746
4 1000 33000 33
1501-2000 33000 30
2001-3000 33000 25
› 3000 33000 20 3308
Unlimited (**) 39155 0
* These plans do not have a minimum residence period
** It only applies since t e l m e x entered the market.
Source: u n e , value added taxes not included in prices. Authors’ calculations.
2  This service was provided since 1917 by the municipality of Medellín. Since 1955 it was 
part of one of the services offered by the local autonomous public entity Empresas Públicas 
de Medellín (e p m). In 2006 this business was divided when the new e p m Telecomunicaciones 
Company was created, under the mixed-nature brand u n e . The company Telmex offered from 
the start a fixed charge with unlimited amount of minutes, to which u n e  responded with the 
same option, but maintaining the tariff plan studied in this paper. All these offers are part 
of packages which include cable television, broad band and telephone service. A complete 
consumer behavior and welfare analysis should consider the different goods offered by 
the companies. Armstrong and Vickers (2007) show that in a multiproduct monopoly case 
non linear tariffs increase firm’s revenues and social welfare but not consumer’s overall 
surplus (there will be winners and losers); when consumers may buy a certain product 
from each firm they can increase their surplus at the expense of the firm’s revenues. When 
there are duopolies offering multiple services, the effects are ambiguous, depending on the 
heterogeneity and elasticity of demand, choice and provider switching costs, and loyalty to 




Minute amounts included on each Fi are 100, 300, 600 and 1000; 
no plans are offered for over 1000 minutes, but the variable charge 
decreases in the ranks 1000-1500, 1501-2000, 2001-3000 and over 
3000 minutes (Bedoya and Ceballos, 2008).
This scheme is a variety of non-linear tariff 5), called in the literature 
Three-Part Tariff, and defined by a fixed or access charge, a “basic” 
consumption amount included in the price and a marginal price for 
each unit of consumption in excess of the basic consumption. The 
fixed charge increases with the basic consumption chosen, and the 
variable charge decreases with each higher consumption plan. There-
fore, a tariff’s marginal price depends on consumption: it is zero if 
it remains within the basic consumption and positive if it exceeds it. 
With respect to the consequences on consumer behavior, Lambrecht 
et al. (2007) have found that: 
1.  Access charge and basic consumption affect mainly the consumer´s 
plan choice more than the expected consumption; this consumption 
will be later determined according to the chosen plan. Therefore, 
there will be a temporary separation between tariff and consump-
tion, unlike traditional two-part tariffs, whose marginal payment 
is constant.
2.  Consumers’ expected expenditure increases with consumption 
variation steering the consumer to prefer high consumption tariff 
plans, mainly if uncertainty over consumption is high. 
3.  Basic charge and consumers’ uncertainty potentially decreases 
consumer’s welfare and increases company’s revenues. These are 
greater than those obtained with a two-part tariff.
4.  The firm will be motivated to focus on consumers with a high 
consumption variability to increase its sales.
A first approximation to the consequences of u n e ’s tariff scheme on 
consumer behavior can be done descriptively (graph 2)3. The dotted 
3  This paper focuses on stratum IV consumers, who, by law, do not receive subsidies or have 
to pay tariff surcharges. Consumption of plans correspond to those of December 2006 and the 
plans had been effective since February 2006. Consumption for two-part tariff was measured 
in impulses for which there is no technical conversion factor because it depended on random 
factors associated with the call, such as telephone answering time and call duration.Graph 156
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line represents the former tariff scheme, T(q) = F + p(q), and the scale 
represents the four three-part tariff packages offered, where 150, 
504 and 746 minutes are the points of indifference between paying 
Fq PP qqand ii ii i () () =+ -    Fq i ii ++ 11 ()  . This means it will be more 
profitable for a consumer with a tariff plan of qi minutes to choose 
qi + 1 when the minutes used in excess of the plan are the same as in 
the indifference point4.
Note, for instance, that if a consumer surpasses 150 minutes and does 
not choose the 300-minute plan, she will pay more, in fact, much more 
when compared with the former tariff. And if consumption is over 489 
minutes, using the 300-minute plan, or over 705 on the 600-minute 
plan, she will pay more than on the former tariff. With regard to the 
1000-minute tariff, there is a long stretch of consumption before both 
income lines cross, which goes from 746 to 2000 minutes. Here we 
find that any increase in consumption across this stretch will lead to 
a greater increase in billing than in consumption due to the curve’s 
slope, and it will be even greater on the two-part tariff. That shows 
there can be losses for some consumers’ welfare, depending on where 
their new consumption is located.
Evidence shows that consumers who signed up for the 100-minute plan 
in December 2006 had an average consumption of 280 minutes, which 
means an overbilling that could have been avoided if the 300-minute 
plan had been chosen, and is much higher than the amount that would 
have been billed on the former plan. Users who bought the 300-minute 
plan consumed 442 minutes on average, which places them below the 
payment line of the two-part tariff and therefore in a better situation. 
Users who signed up for the 600-minute plan used the service during 
832 minutes on average, which places them above the former plan 
and, therefore, in a worse situation. Finally, consumers on the 1000-
2 shows that for the  onversion from impulse into minutes the domestic average calculated 
by the c r t  (2000) was used, which is equivalent to 1.31 minutes per impulse, which results 
in a tariff per minute of 27 pesos on the former plan (See Bedoya and Ceballos, 2008).
4  u n e  allows customers to automatically adjust between each plan by using the “Hable Tran-
quilo” option, at an additional monthly cost of 2500, which is, for instance, equivalent to 
21% of the monthly cost of the plan with the fewest minutes. It can be observed from table 




minute plan consumed 1,462 minutes on average, placing them below 
the dotted line and, therefore, in a better situation5.
A.  Description of the data
For this paper, we consider the local telephone consumption of four 
hundred and ten households (410 households) between February and 
December 2006, as well as their billing and some demographic data 
such as house ownership, time living in the same house, age of house-
hold head, his/her occupation, schooling, total number of people in the 
household, number of people by age range (younger than 19, between 
20 and 29, between 30 and 39 and older than 40 years old) and their 
expenditure on public utilities6.
Table 2 shows the behavior of the variable consumption (minutes 
consumed in excess of the plan chosen by the consumer), the cost of 
this type of consumption (consumption cost), the total consumption 
(minutes included on each plan plus variable consumption) and the 
expenditure on household public utilities7. On average, these variables 
increase throughout the year, together with their typical deviation, 
which means that users have significantly increased their consumption 
throughout the year and, therefore, payment for it has also increased. 
The great variability of the data shows that this payment is not close 
from its average.
5  On previous work, Bedoya and Ceballos (2008) find that users made mistakes when       
choosing their plan and that the adjustment process took all of the year 2006, being more 
critical for low demand users, since high demands are tied to a single plan (1000 minutes), 
which negatively affects these users because they are the ones who value the service the 
most.
6  Bedoya and Ceballos (2008). Consumption and billing data provided by u n e .
7  If a user has all the services, the bill will include local and long distance telephone service, 
electricity, gas, tap water and basic garbage collection service (offered by the garbage 
collection company e v m  but billed by e p m), cable television and Internet. u n e  also offers 
packages that include cable television, Internet and telephone service.158
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* The fixed charge on the former tariff coincides with that of the 100-minute plan. Due to space 
restrictions, the scale for the 1000-minute plan variable charges is not included.
Source: u n e . Authors’ design.











268.0902 456.61197 277.2341 505.91064 307.0455 540.25079 338.9577 530.58524
Consumption 








227,300.06 184,182.41 227,300.06 184,139.73 227,300.06 184,139.73 227,300.06 184,139.73
Number of 
observations
820 1230 1230 1230
(*) Colombian pesos.




It is worth noting that, on average, variable consumption grew by 
8.18% during the year, whereas billing grew by 13.33% and total 
consumption grew only 0.98%. According to table 3, there is a signi-
ficant decrease in the number of 100-minute plan users, whereas the 
other users increase with respect to February levels, mainly those on 
the 300 and 1000-minute plans.
Table 3.  Percentage of users on u n e ´s plans by month, 2006.
 Month
Plan/Minutes
100 300 600 1000
February 6.60% 24.40% 21.70% 47.30%
March 6.60% 23.40% 14.40% 55.60%
April 6.10% 25.90% 17.60% 50.50%
May 4.60% 30.70% 14.90% 49.80%
June 5.60% 25.90% 14.90% 53.70%
July 6.10% 24.60% 17.60% 51.70%
August 8.80% 25.90% 18.00% 47.30%
September 4.10% 26.80% 19.50% 49.50%
October 4.40% 25.90% 20.70% 49.00%
November 4.40% 25.60% 21.50% 48.50%
December 3.90% 25.90% 22.00% 48.30%
Source: u n e . Authors’ calculations.
Table 4.   Descriptive demographic statistics for u n e ’s Four stratum    
 users, February-December, 2006.





Own 246 60.0% Yes 51 12.4%
Rented 164 40.0% No 359 87.6%
N 410 N 410
Time lived in the 
house
Age of household head
Less than one year 73 17.8% Under 19 1 0.2%
One year 15 3.7% Between 20 and 
29 years
30 7.3%
More than one year 92 22.4% Between 30 and 
39 years
57 13.9%
Two or more years 230 56.1% Over 40 years 322 78.5%160
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Table 4.   Descriptive demographic statistics for u n e ’s Four stratum    
  users, February-December, 2006 (continued).
House ownership Do they have the “Hable tranquilo” plan?
Frequency Percentag Frequency Percentag
N 410 N 410
Occupation of 
household head
Schooling of household head
Looking for work 23 5.6% Elementary 86 21.0%
Working 279 68.0% Secondary 108 26.3%




N 410 University degree 114 27.8%
Graduate degree 20 4.9%
  N 410
Source: Bedoya and Ceballos (2008). 
The rest of the variables that will be used represent user demogra-
phic categorizations, which are invariant over time or invariant over 
very short stretches. Most of the houses in which the telephone lines 
are registered are owned by the family who dwells in them (60%) 
and have lived in them for more than 2 years (56.1%). On average, 
the household head is employed, in her forties, and with a technical 
education level. These households, on average, are composed of 3 
members (25.6%). However, 24.1% is composed of 2 people, 23.4% 
of 4 people, 9.5% of one person and the remaining 17.2% of more than 
5 people. Additionally, in 23.2% of these houses there are household 
members under 19; in 23.6% people between 20 and 29 years old; 
in 16.6%, people between 30 and 39 years old, and in 36.5% people 
over 40 years old. 
II. Empirical strategy
A.  Panel data model
A first approximation for investigating consumption behavior and 
expenditure relationships could be performed by specifying a linear 
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Where  Xit  is a matrix of dimension (N × T) × k, of time varying 
household characteristics observables,  Zit  is a set of time invariant 
demographic characteristics and  it  is the classical error term with 
conditional expected value equal to zero. Bedoya and Ceballos (2008) 
estimate this model with interesting results. However, these results do 
not take into account unobservable heterogeneities that characterize 
families or households.
Unlike the first model, we are considering unobservable individual 
effects, so that our specification can be written as follow:
  YX Zi Nt T it it it ii t =+ ++ += = ab l     11 ,..., ;, ...,   (3)
Where  li  is an time invariant individual effect, which could be 
random or fixed, Xit  is the individual characteristics vector, Zi is a set 
of time invariant demographic characteristics, b is the parameter to 
be estimated and nit is the classical error such that  EvX ()  =0.Note 
that different dependent variables generate different specifications. 
In this study, we could use three specifications where the dependent 
variable can be the variable consumption, the total consumption or 
the consumption’s total cost.
 
It is worth noting that non-observable heterogeneity, li , can be corre-
lated with observables. If we have strictly exogenous time varying 
and/or endogenous time invariant observables we could perform fixed 
effect estimators (within group); in doing so we obtain consistent 
estimators just for b. As a matter of fact, it is too difficult to motivate 
no-correlation between the time-invariant non-observable effect and 
the observables, especially with micro data. However, if we want to 
know the effect of time-invariant observables on the outcomes, a kind 
of instrumental variables estimator, via the Hausman-Taylor (h t ) proce-
dure, is needed. Nevertheless, the h t  estimation procedure assumes 
that observables are not correlated with the idiosyncratic error term, 
which sometimes is not satisfied.162
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Let us stress that our dependent variable is defined as the additional 
consumption to the plan chosen by households, so we consider this 
to be the most important outcome for our empirical exercises. The 
following table shows the percentage of households that exceeded their 
minutes’ consumption with respect to what they originally signed up, 
for all the period of the analysis:







Precisely, the percentage of households which exceeded their minutes’ 
consumption are those who signed up for the 300 and 10000 minute 
plans. In general, all of them exceeded their consumption, which 
translates into additional revenue for the service provider, since these 
minutes are drastically more expensive. It is worth noting that by 
definition excess consumption is not constant because it represents 
additional consumption, which in theory has no limit. This is why we 
do not take total consumption as our variable of interest. 
Our matrix Xi for every t, contains the set of independent variables or 
socio-demographic characteristics, which for our specific case are the 
following: number of people per household, whether the household 
head owns the house, the type of plan chosen by the household head, 
log of total expenditure and, finally, the number of years the household 
head has been living in the house, see Table 6 column (0).
It is worth noting that another well-known problem that could arise 
is endogeneity because total public utilities expenditure is included 
in the matrix of regressors and it is jointly determined with telephone 
expenditure and therefore constitute a joint consumption variable. This 
generates an endogeneity problem by simultaneity. As it is usually 
expressed in the Engel curve analysis literature (Banks, Blundell 
and Lewbel (1997); Barrientos (2006, 2009); Blundell, Duncan and 




problem should be solved by using a Two Stages Least Square estimator 
combined with Generalized Least Square transformation-g l s .
In this case, the endogenous variable is the (logarithm of) total expendi-
ture and the instrumental variable par excellence is the family income. 
Additionally, we include as instruments all exogenous variables 
included in the original specification. As we will see this procedure 
strongly improves the estimation of the conditional mean.
B.  A dynamic approach
The empirical specifications (2)-(3) can be considered static, in the 
sense that they do not take into account telephone consumption time 
adjustment with respect to the plan chosen in the past by each house-
hold. To take into account the effect of the adjustment on time, we use 
an empirical model that can be written as:
   Ya yv iN tT it it ii t =+ += = - () ,..., ;, ..., 1 11 l       (4)
where  yit () -1  is the lagged dependent variable, li  is a non-observable 
and time invariant fixed effect and it  is the error term with expected 
value equal to zero and constant variance, serially uncorrelated and 
independent between consumers. We are going to assume that  li  is 
stochastic, and therefore it is necessarily correlated with the lag (unless 
it is a degenerated random variable, which is not the case).
An issue that must be dealt with is the inconsistency of the most 
common estimators in the literature, for instance o l s  or Anderson-
Hsiao estimators. If we apply minimum quadratic regression, we will 
obtain an estimator that is necessarily inconsistent. The source of the 
inconsistency could be eliminated by using first differences, in which 
case the term li  should disappear to obtain the within-group estimator. 
However, this triggers a correlation between the transformed indepen-
dent variable and the transformed error. Increasing N does not make 
it disappear, so it is necessary to use an estimator that is consistent for 
fixed T (compared to N).164
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The empirical strategy should be different to avoid such inconsistency. 
To this end, it is necessary to find an appropriate set of instruments 
to overcome the endogeneity produced by the lagged variable as 
regress() () yit -1 . Since T > 3, we have the pair yi(t-2), yi(t-3) as instruments. 
However, for model (4) to work, it must be expressed in first diffe-
rences:
  a  yy vi Nt T it it it =+ == - () ,..., ;, ..., 1 12       (5)
Where yyy it it it =-- () , 1  with E it  )=0. Using o l s  we will obtain 
an inconsistent estimator, but using Two-Stage Least Squares with 
instruments, which are correlated toyit () -1  but orthogonal to it, we 
will obtain consistent estimators. Nonetheless, by using all the possible 
instruments, or the generalized method of moment’s estimator –g m m , 
it is possible to obtain a more efficient estimator than the one resulting 
from using T-2 instruments (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).
III.   Empirical results
Column 1 in table 6 shows the ordinary least square regression, column 
2 shows the fixed effect estimator, column 3 shows the random effect 
estimator, and column 4 shows the random effect using the instru-
mental variables procedure by performing Two-Stage Least Squares 
estimation, which is enough to guarantee consistency if the true model 
is linear. Column 5 shows the h t  estimator. By construction columns 
(1), (3), (4) and (5) show results pertaining to a kind of Engel curve, 
which relates consumption variable and total expenditure in public 
utilities of household i at moment t. 
According to column 1 the Engel parametric specification does not 
seem to be the most appropriate in this case since the estimated coeffi-
cient of the logarithm of total expenditure on utilities is not statistically 
significant. Note that a simple linear specification such as this in column 
(1) does not seem quite suitable to draw clear conclusions, especially 
if we do not take into account the possible correlation among obser-




Table 6.  Different specifications. 















Variables Coef Z Coef z Coef  z Coef z Coef Z
# People 
Household
0.07 2.2 - - 0.07 2.3 0.05 1.2 -0.05 0.7
Own House -0.16 1.7 - - -0.16 1.8 -0.16 1.5 -0.91 2.7
Plan 300 0.89 5.4 0.92 5.6 0.89 6.5 0.94 6.0 1.03 5.2
Plan 600 0.42 2.5 0.14 0.84 0.42 3.0 0.42 2.8 0.29 1.46
Plan 1000 1.51 8.8 0.68 3.8 1.5 10.0 1.41 9.0 0.95 4.53
Ln(GSP) 2.8 1.48 - - 2.8 1.5 -11.9 1.69 38.0 2.8
(Ln(GSP))2 -0.10 1.3 - - -.10 1.3 0.51 1.79 -1.5 2.7
Time Liv_2 0.15 0.61 - - 0.15 0.6 0.15 0.56 4.7 1.9
Time Liv _3 -0.14 -1.01 - - -0.14 1.0 -0.18 -1.23 6.3 3.7
Time Liv _4 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.25 -0.082 -0.56 2.7 2.5
r: 0.33 0.56 0.33 0.4 0.6
Observations  2541 2541 2541 2541 2541
All the regressions include time dummies, Age and Schooling of h h .
IV Regression. r: Variance fraction due to l.
It is clear too that the fixed effect is not appropriate for estimating our 
Engel Curve. All time-invariant observables were eliminated from 
the model and only information for different plans are still usable. 
Random effect models estimation, or g l s  transformation in column (3), 
even when they include instrumental variables (see column (4)), do 
not allow for enough curvature since the estimated parameter for the 
(Ln(GSP))2 variable is not statistically significant or has an unexpected 
sign. Note that the h t  estimator reports the correct sign for estimated 
parameters, both for total expenditure and its second power.
It is worth noting that estimated parameters for each plan (300, 600 and 
1000) for all specification are positive (and highly significant), which 
is unexpected if agents were completely rational. In fact it means that 
plans lead consumers to exceed they original consumption. Note that 
at the beginning the agents believe that their chosen amount of minutes 
will be enough, do not update their expectations and, on average, end up 166
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with inconsistencies month after month. Price range segmentation, or 
nonlinearity in demand, seems to confirm empirically what the theory 
predicts: the service provider ends up making additional profits from 
the typical consumer’s irrationality and excess consumption. 
Finally, upon estimating model (3), a sustained increase in additional 
consumption can be seen across months if we include time-dummies. 
This dynamic aspect, perhaps roughly expressed in the estimated 
parameters for these time-dummies, is captured in model estimations 
(4) and (5). Table 7 shows a dynamic approximation for the additional 
minutes consumption and its adjustment over time.
From all estimation cases it is possible to find that there is, in general, 
a significant gap in consumption given by the estimated . Additio-
nally, there is another gap in estimation when using the o l s  estimator 
and Within-Group; and even if we use the Two-Stage Least Square 
estimator with only two instruments (AH estimator). For instance, 
we have that  0.67, 0.11 and 0.25 OLSW GA H     . However, 
when estimating using three instruments, the adjustment in variable 
consumption of additional minutes is on average 16%. When using all 
possible instruments, the adjustment in consumption, via an increase 
in additional minutes, is just 13%. All of them are significant and 
independent from the variance and covariance matrix used to obtain 
the standard errors matrix.
Note that we are interested in estimating the parameter a rather than 
the  li vector, a consistent and unbiased estimation of the parameter 
a gives us an idea of consumer behavior at time t conditional on 
the behavior in the past. Given that the dependent variable is excess 
consumption of the families then a negative sing for  would show 
us a sort of rationality, in the sense that additional consumption of 
minutes would show families that every month they make mistakes, 
but every month to a lesser extent.
Empirical results show that the adjustment in additional minutes’ 
consumption in the fixed local telephone service has been on the rise 
across months. Minutes included in the chosen plans have not been 
enough, which has lead to additional consumption that was not in the 




having robust evidence of an adjustment in additional consumption for 
the following months (not even under 5%), inconsistency in additional 
consumption shows that neither consumption plans, nor preferences, 
nor errors were corrected. This indicates a sort of irrationality of the 
agents at the time of signing up for these types of plans.
Table 7.  Dynamic approaching. 
Estimation alternatives for AR(1) specification












d i f o s
(5)
g m m
d i f o s
(6)
g m m
d i f o s
(7)
g m m
d i f o s
(8)
g m m
d i f o s
(9)
g m m
d i f o s
(10)
yi(t-1) 0.67 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.174 0.175 0.154 0.132 0.135 0.138
(30.7) (3.43) (2.4) (2.1) (4.0) (4.1) (3.7) (3.2) (3.4) (4.2)
m1 - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
m2 - - - - 0.88 0.88 0.99 0.88 0.86 0.89
Sargan - - - - - 0.03 0.004 0.002 0.13 0.32
Instru-
ments
- - yi(t-2) yi(t-2) yi(t-2) yi(t-3) yi(t-3) yi(t-2) yi(t-3) yi(t-2)
yi(t-4) yi(t-4) yi(t-4) yi(t-3) yi(t-4) yi(t-3)
yi(t-5) - yi(t-5) -     
-   -  
yi1 yi1
Notes: all estimations include monthly binary time variables. 
Asymptotic errors in parentheses.
m1 and m2 are hypothesis tests for first-and-second order serial correlation, asymptotically they 
are N(0,1).
Results for g m m  are one step with heteroscedastically consistent standard errors.
Sargan a restriction over identification test for g m m  estimators.
IV.   Conclusions
c r t  regulatory commission granted the telecommunications companies 
liberty to offer tariff plans that allowed consumers of the fixed local 
telephone service make choices consistent with their consumption 
plans. This made it possible for the incumbent to offer a three-part 
tariff limited to a reduced number of plans. Theoretical and empirical 
evidence shows that, in general, these plans modify consumer behavior 
(and probably reduce consumers’ welfare, which is a hypothesis to 168
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be tested in the future) since they base their plan choice on the fixed 
charge and the minutes included, and not on their expected consump-
tion. These plans can be designed so that consumers increase their 
consumption over time and even demand plans with more minutes 
included.
The empirical results show that consumers surpass expected consump-
tion levels and therefore the total payment for the service is greater than 
planned. Moreover, the company would rightfully believe that there 
is a high probability that many consumers will decide in the future to 
switch to a plan with more minutes, induced by successive deviations 
from the original plan. As a matter of fact, dynamic specification 
shows that there exists a gap that is not corrected (or updated) over 
time, showing a sort of short-run irrationality that should be corrected 
in the long-run. It is the behavior that we should expect from a typical 
agent in the neo-classical context.
Finally, one important limitation preventing us from drawing more 
robust conclusions is the lack of supplementary socio-demographic 
information both about the household and the household head. 
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